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In his January 2003 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush called for the 
United States to commit $15 billion over five years to address the international HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was greeted with 
surprise from many since much of the world’s attention was focused on the impending war in 
Iraq, and few officials in either the countries to receive aid or existing assistance providers had 
advance warning of the announcement.  Additionally, the sum of money involved was 
unprecedented and dwarfed previous administration commitments to fighting AIDS 
internationally. 
For many observers, surprise was then replaced with excitement tempered by skepticism.  
Excitement came not only from the amount of money involved, but from a hope that the tragic 
scope of the AIDS epidemic and its potential impact on U.S. and global interests was now being 
acknowledged as a security issue.  If so, funding and high level government attention could be 
expected to continue for years to come.  Also, support from both parties in Congress and an 
unusual mix of liberal and conservative nongovernmental groups raised the possibility that 
PEPFAR could be a model for further U.S. aid initiatives and focus on humanitarian objectives. 
Skepticism stemmed from a fear that the announcement was simply a rhetorical effort to 
build America’s image and soft-power at a time that its use of military power in Iraq was 
opposed by many in the international community.  There also were questions of whether 
Congress would ever appropriate such a large figure given other spending priorities and 
mounting fears of a budget deficit.  And, if Congress did appropriate the money, whether other 
important medical and humanitarian programs would be reduced.  Finally, there was worry that 
political calculations and moral agendas would carry more weight than best practice medical 
experience in shaping specific program goals. 
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Three years later, it seems that both some excitement and some skepticism were 
warranted.  The administration and Congress have stuck to their spending commitments and U.S. 
funded programs are now showing signs of success.  The early shape of the program also, 
though, provides important clues on whether AIDS will be treated as a security issue in the 
future, whether the United States will act bilaterally or channel future aid programs through the 
UN, how U.S. economic interests remain a factor in developing aid programs, and whether the 
liberal-conservative coalition will hold together or split over programmatic limits designed to 
please Bush’s conservative Christian constituency.  These clues are significant not only for 
PEPFAR’s future, but for U.S. aid programs and North-South relations more generally. 
 
An Overview of PEPFAR’s Origins and Actions 
Although unprecedented in its scope and scale, Bush’s 2003 announcement was not the 
first U.S. action on international AIDS, or even the first of Bush’s administration.  The full 
magnitude of the AIDS crisis became apparent to government officials in the 1990s. In 1996, a 
UN program was created to coordinate global efforts, but funding was minimal.  In time, Clinton 
administration officials came to speak of AIDS as a national security issue and gave it increased 
prominence.  Funding of U.S. programs to combat the disease was gradually increased.  Still, in 
2000, a Clinton signed bill authorized only $150 million for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to be 
administered by the World Bank and $300 billion in bilateral spending.   
In 1999, Clinton took another subtle, but important, step.  He announced that the United 
States would no longer seek sanctions against countries that produced cheaper generic versions 
of AIDS drugs, even if foreign companies had broken U.S. patent laws to produce those drugs.  
Bush’s first action on AIDS was his February 2001 decision not to alter Clinton’s policy on 
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enforcing patent rights.  This decision was controversial among Bush supporters.  Some were 
suspicious about anything Clinton had done, but also U.S. pharmaceutical companies were 
aggressively lobbying for a firmer stand.  
In the spring of 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan put new pressure on world 
governments by suggesting a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  UN experts 
suggested the fund would need $7-8 billion annually to have a significant impact.  On May 27, 
2001, Bush announced that the United States would make a founding contribution of $200 
million to the Global Fund and pledged to add more once programs proved to be effective.  At 
this time, administration officials pressed the UN to spend most of its money on prevention 
rather than treatment.  For example, Agency for International Development (USAID) 
administrator Andrew Natsios testified to Congress that sending antiretrovirals to African 
countries would be ineffective given their lack of trained doctors, limited infrastructure, and 
Africans’ inability to follow a complicated treatment regimen because of their insufficient 
knowledge about watches and clocks.1  In June 2002, Bush announced a new U.S. prevention 
initiative of $500 million to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV.   
Within the administration, support for increased AIDS programs came from a number of 
cabinet members, other top aides, and from Bush himself, who reportedly came to see it as a 
moral matter, but feared that money would not be spent effectively.2  Meanwhile in Congress, 
support was mounting from both liberal Democrats, who had long pushed for greater action, and 
key Republicans.  Senator Bill Frist, the majority leader after 2003 and a heart surgeon who 
volunteered for medical missions in Africa, and Senator Jesse Helms, formerly a sharp critic of 
                                                 
1 For Natsios’ comments and reaction to them, see Miles A. Pomper, “U.S. Agonizes Over Commitment to Fighting 
AIDS in Africa,” CQ Weekly, June 23, 2001. 
2 Mike Allen and Paul Blustein, “Unlikely Allies Influenced Bush to Shift Course on AIDS Relief,” The Washington 
Post, January 30, 2003; and Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush AIDS Effort Surprises Many, 
But Advisers Call It Long Planned,” The New York Times, January 30, 2003. 
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most U.S. aid programs, were particularly crucial players.  The liberal-conservative alliance in 
Congress was mirrored in nongovernmental groups ranging from traditionally liberal 
humanitarian and medically-focused groups to conservative Christian groups.  The role of 
evangelical Christian groups is intriguing since early in the AIDS epidemic they at times 
suggested that AIDS was God’s punishment for immoral behavior, but, by the late-1990s, key 
leaders such as Billy Graham’s son Franklin argued that Christians had a religious responsibility 
to assist the sick.3  It is an overstatement to suggest that Bush moved forward simply to placate 
his Christian conservative base, sharp decreases in antiretroviral prices and encouraging data on 
Uganda’s programs were certainly at least as important, but, as Bono, the Irish rock star and 
longtime AIDS activist, commented, “The administration isn’t afraid of rock stars and student 
activists—they are used to us. But they are nervous of soccer moms and church folk. Now when 
soccer moms and church folk start hanging around with rock stars and activists, then they really 
start paying attention.”4   
The stage was therefore set for Bush’s January 2003 announcement: 
The Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief -- a work of mercy beyond all current 
international efforts to help the people of Africa. This comprehensive plan will 
prevent 7 million new AIDS infections, treat at least 2 million people with life-
extending drugs, and provide humane care for millions of people suffering from 
AIDS, and for children orphaned by AIDS. I ask the Congress to commit $15 billion 
over the next five years, including nearly $10 billion in new money, to turn the tide 
against AIDS in the most afflicted nations of Africa and the Caribbean. This nation 
can lead the world in sparing innocent people from a plague of nature.5 
 
The $15 billion commitment included $5 billion for existing bilateral programs 
throughout the world, $1 billion for the Global Fund, and $9 billion for new programs in 14 
                                                 
3 Holly Burkhalter, “The Politics of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs, 83  (Jan/Feb2004): 8-14; and  Helen Epstein, “God and 
the Fight Against AIDS,” The New York Review of Books, April 28, 2005. 
4 Bono, as quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “The World: A Calling to Heal; Getting Religion on AIDS,” The New 
York Times, February 2, 2003. 
5 “State of the Union, 2003” available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. 
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targeted countries.6  The target countries were home to roughly half of the world’s 40 million 
people living with HIV/AIDS.  It was noteworthy that Bush established specific targets for 
prevention, treatment, and care before any of the programs details were established.  Also, 
important was the new idea of going beyond prevention to treatment, which would eventually 
represent a little more than half of all PEPFAR spending.  A major portion of the prevention 
spending was to be modeled on Uganda’s highly regarded ABC program- Abstinence, Be 
faithful to your partner, use a Condom. 
In May 2003, not coincidently just before Bush traveled to a G8 meeting where he would 
meet some of his European critics, Congress passed the necessary authorizing legislation.  The 
legislation largely mirrored Bush’s plans, but included three important limits.  On the House 
floor, an amendment, supported by considerable administration lobbying, passed requiring that at 
least one-third of all prevention funds, which constituted 20 percent of overall funding, be spent 
to promote sexual abstinence until marriage.  A second amendment allowed faith-based groups 
to reject strategies they considered objectionable, such as condom distribution.  Third, the law 
authorized up to $1 billion per year for the Global Fund, five times what Bush had favored, but it 
did not require that amount and also stipulated that U.S. contributions could be no more than 
one-third of total contributions to the Fund in any given year.  These limitations had less support 
in the Senate, but Frist led the Senate to adopt the House bill by arguing that in this case, “We 
can’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.”7 
Money for PEPFAR was not appropriated until November 2003 and the need to develop 
a new program bureaucracy the further delayed activity, so little funding was dispersed the first 
                                                 
6 The original target countries were Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Vietnam was added in 2004 after Congress 
mandated that a country outside of Africa and the Caribbean be added. 
7 Frist as quoted in Niels C. Sorrells, “Political Expediency Takes Over As Senate Passes AIDS Relief Bill,” CQ 
Weekly, May 17, 2003. 
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year.  Even through March 2005, only three percent of the authorized funds had been spent.8  By 
the spring of 2006, however, the administration was able to provide impressive numbers in its 
second annual report to Congress.  Overall U.S. spending on international AIDS was $2.3 billion 
in FY2004, $2.6 billion in FY2005, $3.2 billion in FY2006, and was projected to be $4.0 billion 
in FY2007.9  Thus, the administration, with some prodding from Congress which increased early 
funding levels, appeared on track to reach its goal of $15 billion in 5 years.  More than 1,200 
prime or subcontractors had received funds.  Just under half of the prime contractors were 
indigenous organizations.  Roughly 80 percent of all contractors were nongovernmental 
organizations and, by FY2005, a quarter of all contractors were faith-based. 
Prevention funding had supported outreach activities to over 40 million people.  An 
estimated almost 50,000 infant HIV infections had been prevented through mother-to-child 
programs.  Abstinence and fidelity programs received $75.6 million in 2005, 7 percent of overall 
spending, while programs that support condom distribution and related programs received $65.7 
million or 6 percent of overall funding.  The administration thus argued that it was well on its 
way to the goal of preventing seven million infections. 
Antiretroviral treatment had been supported for 401,000 people in the targeted countries 
and another 70,000 people worldwide through September 2005.  These figures kept the program 
well away from its target of 2 million receiving treatment in part because of the slow approval of 
generic drugs using PEPFAR funding and in part because of significant logistical difficulties in 
some countries.  It also should be noted that there is much controversy over how the United 
States reached these figures.  Almost half of the people worldwide said to be receiving U.S. 
supported treatment were benefiting from the Global Fund and thus only indirect U.S. funding.  
                                                 
8 Laurie Garrett, “The Lessons of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs, 84, (July/Aug2005): 51. 
9 These and the following statistics are found in Action Today, A Foundation for Tomorrow: The President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, Second Annual Report to Congress, February 2006. 
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Also, the United States has released various figures of 20,000 to 32,000 for patients in Botswana 
using the idea that patients receiving treatment after the country received funds for general 
“system strengthening” should be included.  The manager of Botswana’s treatment program 
called the U.S. figures “a gross misrepresentation of the facts” and several Botswanan officials 
have said that not a single person is receiving treatment as a direct result of U.S. funding.10 
Overall, PEPFAR’s first years have far exceeded the expectations of its critics and it 
should not be forgotten that, even if one adjusted the disputed numbers downward, the recent 
figures are several fold better than before 2003.  PEPFAR has not, though, reached the bold 
goals of its supporters and its legacy on several policy disputes has generated much controversy. 
 
AIDS as a Security Issue 
In its first years, AIDS was thought of largely as a medical problem.  As the scope and 
impact of the disease became more clear, discussions centered on AIDS as a social and economic 
challenge for certain countries.  Beginning in the late-1990s, the terms of discussion shifted once 
more and the AIDS epidemic came to be described as a security issue.  This shift was apparent in 
the academic literature as articles on AIDS appeared in several major journals in the field of 
security studies.11  It also was evident in government discussions. 
By 1999, key members of the Clinton administration, particularly ambassador to the UN 
Richard Holbrooke and Vice-President Al Gore, were committed to putting AIDS on the security 
agenda.  Their efforts led to an unprecedented January 2000 discussion of the issue in the UN 
                                                 
10 Segolame Ramotlwa, as quoted in Craig Timberg, “Botswana’s Gains Against AIDS Put U.S. Claims to Test,” 
The Washington Post, July 1, 2005. 
11 J. Stephen Morrison, “The African Pandemic Hits Washington,” The Washington Quarterly, 24 (Winter 2001): 
197-209; Stefan Elbe, “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security, 27 (Fall 
2002); Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Future of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs, 81 (Nov/Dec 2002): 22-45; Gwyn Prins, “AIDS 
and Global Security,” International Affairs, 80 (2004): 931-52. 
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Security Council.  There, and elsewhere, supporters made the case that the epidemic’s impact on 
social systems, economies, governing capacities, militaries, and peacekeeping operations meant 
that it would affect not just individuals, but institutions, and thus it was a “security threat of the 
greatest magnitude.”12  There also was an argument based on the emerging idea of “human 
security” that, even if AIDS somehow did not affect broad institutions, it would affect the core 
individual right of life and therefore should be seen as a security concern.  In July 2000, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1308, which declared that action was necessary before the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic could threaten world stability and security.  At that same time, Clinton 
announced that AIDS would now be considered a threat to U.S. national security. 
The advantages of defining AIDS in security terms are complex, but a few points stand 
out.13  One major advantage is that security issues are like playing trumps.  They immediately 
rise to the top of the policy agenda.  They also tend to get long-term commitments of leaders’ 
time and country resources.  Additionally, if AIDS contributed to acceptance of the concept of 
protecting human security, that could have major implications for issues such as global warming, 
famine, or human rights abuses. 
There also were potential disadvantages of putting AIDS on the security agenda.  To 
make the case of a security threat, there has to be fear of a clear and present danger.  This has the 
potential to further stigmatize individuals who suffer from AIDS, or countries with large 
numbers of infected citizens.  Many African countries were therefore hesitant about, or even 
opposed to, defining AIDS in such sweeping terms.  Generating fear of an imminent threat also 
raises the question of how you know when that threat has receded sufficiently to declare it 
eliminated.  Many observers also worried that defining an issue as a security threat meant it 
                                                 
12 Gore’s speech to the UN as quoted in Prins, 941. 
13 Some of the following discussion is based on Prins, 940. 
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would now be controlled by state responses and political calculations rather than by private 
groups making medical and scientific judgments.  A problem reminiscent of how development 
aid came to be seen primarily as a tool of anticommunism during the Cold War. 
Intriguingly, under Bush, as AIDS rose on the U.S. agenda and funding surged, talk of 
AIDS as a security problem greatly receded.  The countries targeted for most U.S. aid did not 
include China, India, and Russia, three strategically important countries that analysts suggest 
might be shaken by the second wave of the pandemic.  AIDS receives only passing mention in 
Bush’s National Security Strategy released in 2002.  In his major comments on the issue, for 
example a detailed speech given days after the 2003 State of the Union introduced PEPFAR, his 
comments at the signing ceremony of the authorization law, his remarks while visiting Africa, 
and speeches delivered on annual World AIDS days, Bush never used the word security.  
Instead, those speeches repeat themes first enunciated in January 2003: 
We have a chance to achieve a more compassionate world for every citizen. America 
believes deeply that everybody has worth, everybody matters, everybody was created 
by the Almighty, and we're going to act on that belief and we'll act on that passion.14 
 
The first major idea is that action should be taken from pure compassion and a desire to 
preserve human dignity.  In essence, “compassionate conservatism” brought to the international 
arena.  Second, Bush often argues that the U.S. has a special role on issues of human dignity 
because of its long history of compassionate policies such as the Marshall Plan, the Berlin 
Airlift, and the Peace Corps.  Third, Bush frequently ties AIDS relief to a religious obligation to 
help the suffering because all humans are God’s creations. 
Continued attention and funding after the switch from security to humanitarian and 
religious justifications can be read in a positive light as showing that the United States and the 
                                                 
14 “Fighting Global HIV/AIDS, January 31, 2003” available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131-4.html. 
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broader world community are finally acting for the betterment of humanity rather than for pure 
national interests.  However, if international politics have not been so revolutionized, it may 
mean that, in time, AIDS programs will lose the priority they would have received as a security 
issue.  So far, they have withstood focus on the war on terrorism and competing humanitarian 
focus on aid for tsunami and hurricane Katrina victims, but whether they will continue to 
withstand such pressures, especially under a less religious focused administration, is in doubt.   
Also, it is now clear that few Americans ever fully accepted the security arguments.  As 
long as the epidemic remains centered in Africa, the economic and security interests at risk are 
too small and too remote for the average American to be concerned.  The concept of human 
security remains, but is not widely used outside of academic or UN circles.  In the future, the 
United States may choose to continue action against AIDS, and may choose to act in other 
humanitarian cases, but it does not feel compelled to act on security grounds.  Continued talk of 
AIDS as a security issue may in fact bring more negatives in terms of stigma and politicized 
programs than any small gain. 
 
Bilateral versus Global Action 
Almost as soon as Bush announced the major U.S. initiative under PEPFAR, observers 
began to question what relationship the bilateral program would have with the recently created 
UN Global Fund.  Bush was careful to announce plans to continue donations to the Fund and 
noted that U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson had just been 
elected Chair of the Fund’s Board.  From the UN, as well, the official view was that the 
programs were complementary, not adversarial. 
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There were, though, clear signs of friction from both sides.  The day of Bush’s State of 
the Union address Anil Soni, adviser to the Global Fund’s executive director, commented that 
the United States “taking a unilateral approach” could hamper care for victims.15  Subsequently, 
Ambassador Stephen Lewis, the UN Secretary General’s special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, 
became a frequent and blunt critic of U.S. funding priorities and prevention strategies.  Other top 
UN officials also pressed for sharp increases in U.S. support for the Fund.  Meanwhile, 
administration officials criticized the Fund’s management and effectiveness.  Bush’s initial five 
year plan called for donating $1 billion to the Fund a fraction of the $14 billion to be spent on 
bilateral programs.  The president’s budget requests repeatedly targeted only $200 million 
annually for the Fund, but Congress increased the donations in each year from FY2003 to 
FY2005, so total U.S. funding was more than double the president’s requested figure. 
Among those interested in AIDS policy, a fierce debate has raged over whether in the 
long-run UN, or U.S., programs are preferable.  Some support for the UN comes from baseline 
anti-U.S. and pro-multilateral sentiments, but Fund supporters raise several other points.  In a 
world where AIDS is creating massive problems and where resources to combat the epidemic are 
finite, it is crucial to pool funds and knowledge, rather than set up multiple programs each with 
their own bureaucratic overhead and own expertise.  The UN has existing institutional ties in 
many countries and, generally, those programs do not trigger the same domestic opposition as 
programs led by specific richer countries like the United States.  Working through a multilateral 
forum also decreases the chance that the political interests or moral preferences of any one 
country will dominate decisions.  Finally, the Fund’s money is disbursed in grants to local 
groups, so more of the money goes to citizens of those countries, not large international NGOs, 
                                                 
15 Soni, as quoted in Allen and Blustein. 
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and there is greater potential for local capacity building.16  Supporters of working through the 
Fund also suggest that it could help U.S. interests if the United States was perceived as the leader 
of a global humanitarian effort and if other countries shared the financial burden of AIDS 
activism. 
Those favoring channeling most, or all, of the money through bilateral programs argue 
that the UN agencies are not the right vehicle for a major health program.  Historically, the UN 
had placed little emphasis on programs that directly provided medical care, plus multiple 
agencies shared responsibility for AIDS responses.  These problems have been lessened with 
expertise gained in recent years and a consolidation of offices under UNAIDS, but doubts about 
capacity remain.  There are also long-standing questions about the UN’s financial practices and 
supervision of those receiving grants.  In contrast, U.S. programs could be guided by 
professionals with years of experience in health management and treatment programs.  A 
bilateral program would have a single central bureaucracy and tight monitoring of dispersed 
funds.  Furthermore, although the United States would likely be the largest financial contributor 
to a multilateral effort, it would have to share planning and operational responsibility.  In 
contrast, a U.S. program could be fully guided by U.S. interests and perspectives, which would 
also make it easier to hold together the domestic coalition supporting the program.   
Of course, decisions between multilateral and bilateral programs are not made entirely 
through debates of their theoretic benefits.  In this case, the Fund’s performance to date has 
reinforced many of the worries expressed by its critics and therefore lessened the likelihood of 
multilateral efforts in the future.  Even those generally favorably inclined to the Fund have been 
sharply critical of its slow disbursement of money.  Through the spring of 2005, virtually no 
                                                 
16 Some of these points are detailed in J. Stephen Morrison and Todd Summers, “United to Fight HIV/AIDS?” The 
Washington Quarterly, 26 (Autumn 2003): 177-193. 
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funds had been used to buy antiretrovirals, despite the fact that millions of dollars in grants had 
been approved.  In many cases, the money remained in bank accounts while UN and local 
bureaucracies slowly established programs.  There also have been problems in financial 
accountability.  The Fund had to suspend grants in Ukraine in January 2004 and Uganda in 
August 2005 when mismanagement was reported.  The Fund has also suffered from a severe lack 
of international financial support.  Although the United States has committed the vast majority of 
its money to bilateral efforts, it still has l provided close to 30 percent of the Fund’s contributions 
in most years.  In 2003, the United States exceeded the congressionally mandated limit of 33 
percent of funding, so $87.8 million had to be held back in contributions the following year.  The 
Fund is so short of money that, in September 2005, it approved 26 grants totaling $382 million 
over the first two years, but had to only provisionally accept another 37 grants costing $344 
million in hopes that new funds would become available.  The combination of slow 
disbursements, suspended programs, and limited funding of new grants has left the UN far 
behind its goal of treating 3 million patients by 2005. 
Even had the Fund not stumbled, it is unlikely that the United States would have chosen 
to funnel the majority of its money through the UN.  The arguments for a coordinated global 
response would convince most countries, but the United States simply is not the same as most 
countries.  Although historically it has been a global leader for human rights and humanitarian 
action, the United States has been hesitant to commit to multilateral initiatives.  It has stayed on 
the outside of UN conventions, numerous human rights treaties, and now the international 
criminal court, because of the country’s self-confidence that it knows best and should thus be a 
leader not a joiner, and a strong determination to preserve U.S. sovereignty.  These factors have 
now been reinforced by the U.S. role as the world’s only superpower.  The United States can 
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afford to pursue many of its international goals unilaterally and thus sees multilateral initiatives 
not as burden sharing opportunities, but as constraints on its policy control.  America’s tendency 
to unilateralism was heightened by Bush’s views of the world and then again by international 
disagreements over the war in Iraq, but it was not created by this administration and likely will 
not end with this administration.17  Therefore, while some observers may prefer that 
humanitarian actions, and AIDS programs specifically, come from the UN, they are likely 
wasting their breath and possibly missing any chance they had to shape U.S. bilateral efforts. 
 
Factoring in Economic Interests 
International aid programs are generally described in humanitarian or, at times, security 
terms, but it is also important to remember that they are big business.  The contract to oversee 
distribution of U.S. assistance is worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  Increased spending on 
condoms means major new orders for condom producers.  Most clearly, though, the move to 
spend significant U.S. money on treatment would have a huge impact on the pharmaceutical 
industry.  One small indication of this was the creation of two lobby groups, the Corporate Task 
Force on AIDS and the Coalition for AIDS Relief in Africa, which brought together major 
pharmaceutical companies such as Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Abbott Laboratories, Pfizer and 
others to lobby Congress in support PEPFAR funding. 
Through the spring of 2004, the administration held that to protect patent rights PEPFAR 
funds could only be spent on name-brand U.S. produced drugs.  Bush still allowed companies in 
countries like India and Brazil to make generic versions of U.S.-patented drugs, but those 
companies were not supposed to export those drugs.  Bush also sent an interesting signal on the 
                                                 
17 For more on how U.S. preferences and global power shape its human rights policies, see John W. Dietrich, “U.S. 
Human Rights Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Continued Structural Constraints Across Time and 
Administrations,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 2006). 
 15 
issue by appointing Randall Tobias, the former chairman of Eli Lilly & Company who had no 
specific experience on AIDS or African politics, as U.S. Global Aids Coordinator overseeing the 
entire PEPFAR bureaucracy.  While traveling in South Africa in 2004, Tobias commented about 
generics: 
Patients . . . in Africa deserve to have assurances about the safety and effectiveness of 
drugs in the same way that people in the United States do. Maybe these drugs are safe 
and effective. Maybe these drugs are, in fact, exact duplicates of research-based 
drugs. Maybe they aren’t. Nobody really knows.18 
 
Others, however, argued that the generics were indeed safe because they had been 
approved through the World Health Organization’s (W.H.O.) prequalification program and were 
being distributed by several governments, international NGOs, and groups financed by the UN 
Fund.  They also argued that generics should be a crucial part of any major treatment strategy 
because their cost was only one-third, or less, the cost of U.S. brands.  Furthermore, patient 
compliance with drug regimens could be increased by using 3-in-1 combination pills that were at 
the time not available from any U.S. manufacturer.  
Pressure to change U.S. policy came from a host of players.  AIDS activists argued that 
the President’s comments on human dignity would ring hollow if the United States did not take 
every action possible to increase treatment numbers.  Pressure also came from U.S. allies as 
representatives of the European Union’s drug regulatory authority did not attend a U.S. led 
conference on generic medications and from U.S.-based service providers who hoped to buy 
drugs at the lowest available price.  In May 2004, the administration shifted policy to permit 
PEPFAR funding of 3-in-1 pills and other generics, but only after they had Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval.  To facilitate approval, the FDA would waive the usual 
$500,000 application fee and expedite the approval process. 
                                                 
18 Tobias as quoted in Nina Siegal, “No Experience Necessary: A Profile of Bush’s AIDS Czar,” The Progressive 
(November 2004): 33. 
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Critics of U.S. policies argued that requiring FDA approval would not only slow delivery 
of drugs, but also was redundant given W.H.O. prequalification, and therefore was really a 
political move to once again assert U.S. independence.  The administration maintained that 
careful approval procedures would decrease the chance of later problems.  No generics 
completed the FDA process until January of 2005 and it was not until the end of 2005 that 
significant generics were being purchased.  Additionally, U.S. companies remained the main 
providers of drugs for children and of second generation drugs used once drug resistance builds 
up. 
Overall, the generic drug issue is an unusual example of a U.S. administration reversing 
policies in a way that put humanitarian objectives above economic gains for U.S. companies.  
Still, it appears likely to be the exception rather than the rule for future cases.  This issue saw a 
particularly strong coalition of actors pushing for change, a rare case of a direct comparison 
between a U.S. and an equivalent foreign product, and a situation where lives potentially hung in 
the balance.  In most cases, one or more of those conditions will not exist.  Therefore policy is 
more likely to resemble Bush’s original plan that would have quietly pumped billions of dollars 
into U.S. corporations. 
 
Ideological Disputes 
One of the main domestic constituencies supporting PEPFAR is Christian conservatives 
and President Bush supports many of their policy positions, so it is hardly surprising that some of 
the conservatives’ preferences have been built into PEPFAR programs.  On several issues, that 
conservative lean now threatens both programmatic success and the conservative-liberal 
coalition that worked together to initiate PEPFAR.  There are several smaller issues in dispute 
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and large controversies over the roles of abstinence, condom distribution, and faith-based 
programs. 
By law, the U.S. government does not fund programs that exchange used needles for 
clean ones, although it does allow money to go to groups that use other funds to administer 
needle exchange programs.  The argument against needle exchanges is that they support or 
encourage drug use.  This policy has not been a major factor to date in U.S. AIDS efforts, 
because drug use is not a significant source of infections in Africa.  It could grow in importance 
as the epidemic moves to Russia and China where needles are a major source of infection.   
On abortion policies the U.S. government has even more restrictive rules.  Under the 
Mexico City policy, no international aid may go to a group if any of that group’s activities 
promote abortion.  As PEPFAR legislation was moving through Congress, Bush announced that 
this rule would be somewhat relaxed for groups fighting AIDS, as long as they kept AIDS funds 
separate from other funds.  Still, in August 2003, the administration terminated funding for a 
well regarded AIDS program run by a consortium of seven groups, because Marie Stopes 
International had worked with the UN Population Fund that in turn had worked with the Chinese 
government that promotes abortion.   
A third policy that has triggered debate is a legislative requirement that prohibits funding 
of any group that does not have an explicit, written policy opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking.  DKT, a firm that markets and distributes condoms, has sued the U.S. government 
arguing that the requirement is a violation of free speech.  In May 2005, the Brazilian 
government refused $40 million in U.S. assistance because it felt that the requirement would 
further stigmatize sex workers and make it difficult to provide AIDS information and outreach to 
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an important target group.  Most countries cannot afford the loss of U.S. dollars, so, if they 
choose not to sign the pledge, they may scale back programs rather than risk losing U.S. funds. 
Much greater controversy has surrounded U.S. backed abstinence programs.  Under the 
amendment added to the authorization legislation, at least one-third of all funds spent on 
prevention activities must go to abstinence and fidelity programs.  This number is somewhat 
deceiving because mother-to-child transmission and blood safety programs are also included 
under prevention.  Therefore, only 50 percent of prevention funds go to prevent sexual 
transmission, so two-thirds of those funds must go to abstinence and the remaining one-third 
covers all other counseling programs, condom distribution, and other activities.  The President 
and PEPFAR strategy documents defend this focus with the idea that abstinence is the only 
guaranteed way to prevent infection and evidence from Uganda and elsewhere that sexual 
practices and infection rates were altered once the government began promoting the Abstinence 
and Be faithful parts of the ABC strategy.19  Others, such as Edward C. Green, a medical 
anthropologist at the Harvard School of Public Health, argue that the fact that conservatives may 
favor this approach for social, as well as medical, reasons does not mean that the strategy does 
not work.20 
Critics point out that, while abstinence promotion has a place in AIDS prevention, such a 
large focus is unwise.  New data from a study conducted by Ugandan scientists in collaboration 
with Columbia and Johns Hopkins University shows that the effect of educational messages in 
Uganda seems to have peaked and that, in the last decade, the number of men in the study having 
                                                 
19 The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Five-Year Global HIV/AIDS Strategy, Department of State, 
2004. 
20 Edward C. Green, “The New AIDS Fight; A Plan as Simple as ABC,” The New York Times, March 1, 2003. 
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two or more nonmarital sex partners has increased significantly.21  More broadly, the Center for 
Health and Gender Equity reports that a survey of the available literature suggests “that 
abstinence-only programs have high rates of failure in terms of both infection and other adverse 
outcomes, such as unintended pregnancy.”22  Furthermore, the large percentage of money going 
to abstinence programs crowds out funding for more general sexual education programs that can 
inform participants about how the infection spreads and contraceptive options.  Given that the 
median age for first sexual encounter among women is just over 16 in many African countries 
and that over 50 percent of adolescent women are married in parts of Africa and Asia,23 an 
abstinence focus is targeting only a small percentage of those at risk of infection. 
On condoms, PEPFAR’s strategy documents propose rapid increases in condom 
distribution targeted at specific high-risk populations such as prostitutes, soldiers, sero-
discordant couples and substance abusers.  Distribution outlets should be placed near areas where 
high-risk behavior takes place, so that the general population receives a clear message that 
avoiding risk is the best mean of preventing infection.  Under these guidelines, the administration 
has increased both funding for condoms and the numbers of condoms distributed per year. 
The problem with targeting only high risk populations is twofold.  First, reports from 
targeted countries indicate that condom users are now becoming stigmatized as promiscuous and 
irresponsibly pro-sex.24  In societies that have long avoided open discussions of sexual topics, 
policies that encourage negatives views of those who take steps to protect themselves could lead 
to more misinformation and unsafe sexual practices, and therefore more infections. Second, in 
                                                 
21 Lawrence K. Altman, “Study Challenges Abstinence As Crucial to AIDS Strategy,” The New York Times, 
February 24, 2005. 
22 Center for Health and Gender Equity, Debunking the Myths in the U.S. Global AIDS Strategy: An Evidence-Based 
Analysis, March 2004, 8. 
23 Center for Health and Gender Equity, 6. 
24 Beatrice Were, “The Destructive Strings of U.S. Aid,” The International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2005. 
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countries with adult infection rates as high as 20 or 30 percent, it is difficult to argue that anyone 
sexually active is not at high risk.  There are the sexually active single youth discussed above, 
but also married women, who remain at significant risk if their husbands have other sexual 
partners, and neither abstinence education nor condoms for high risk populations address this 
group. 
A third major point of debate has been the role of faith-based organizations.  The 
administration argues that in many rural areas faith-based organizations are the only established 
institutions providing aid and that, in general, religious organizations are deeply passionate in 
their commitments.  Bush also feels that in both domestic and international settings faith-based 
groups should not be discriminated against based on their organizing principles.  Administration 
critics point out that there now appears to be reverse discrimination, favoring faith-based over 
secular groups.  In several cases, major funds have gone to religious groups with little or no 
experience in AIDS programs or in Africa.  Conservative religious groups such as Focus on the 
Family have sent Members of Congress lists of organizations, including non-evangelical 
Christian organizations, which they feel are not fully committed to anti-abortion, anti-
prostitution, pro-abstinence messages and therefore should be denied funding in the future.   
In an incident highlighting the overall issue, USAID’s Natsios approved a grant in the fall 
of 2004 for the Children’s AIDS Fund, a Washington based group that promotes abstinence 
education and is led by Anita M. Smith, who has close ties to President Bush.  In the earlier 
review process, an expert committee had judged that the request was “not suitable for funding.”25  
Natsios approved the project in part because the Children’s AIDS Fund has ties with the Uganda 
Youth Forum led by Janet Museveni, the first lady of Uganda and an evangelical Christian.  This 
                                                 
25 David Brown, “Group Awarded AIDS Grant Despite Negative Appraisal,” The Washington Post, February 16, 
2005. 
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relationship shows that a simple view of the U.S. pushing religious and moral values on the rest 
of the world misses the facts that there has been a major rise of evangelical Christian groups in 
Uganda and that the first lady’s influence has played a major part in the Ugandan government’s 
recent criticism of condoms and promotion of abstinence.  Still, it should be noted that many 
faith-based groups openly acknowledge that they share their religious perspectives as they 
distribute education and assistance. 
The exact impact of Bush’s choices on abstinence, condoms, faith-based agencies, and 
other issues is difficult to assess.  In politics, though, perceptions often matter as much as hard 
facts.  In many eyes, U.S. programs are not following established best practices and are using 
money as leverage to spread conservative moral and religious views.  Stephen Lewis of the UN 
commented that a shortfall of condoms in Uganda was “being driven and exacerbated by 
PEPFAR and by the extreme policies that the administration in the United States is now 
pursuing.”26  In PEPFAR’s early days, there were tense meetings between U.S. officials and 
leaders in Mozambique who perceived U.S. policies as arrogant and neocolonial.27  Top U.S. 
officials are aggressively booed and heckled at International AIDS Conferences.  Clearly, if one 
goal of the administration was to improve its world image through humanitarian efforts, this has 
not worked and, instead, administration policy choices have reconfirmed views of the U.S. as a 
unilateral power imposing its views on others. 
Critical perceptions have also increased within certain U.S. nongovernmental groups.  To 
some degree, this may reflect the fact that by definition activists are rarely satisfied with existing 
policies and tend to express their views in sharp language.  This baseline distrust was shown 
when critics held a conference call to denounce a Bush speech, even though none of the group 
                                                 
26 Lewis as quoted in Jeevan Vasagar and Julian Borger, “Bush accused of AIDS damage in Africa,” The Guardian, 
August 30, 2005. 
27 Deborah Sontag, “Early Tests for U.S. in Its Global Fight on AIDS,” The New York Times, July 14, 2004. 
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had actually listened to the speech.28  The criticism also, though, reflects the view that, when the 
conservatives became interested in what previously had been a liberal issue, they effectively took 
programmatic control leaving the liberals on the outside of decisions, but in an awkward position 
since Bush is providing far more funding and attention than any previous president.  It is an 
interesting question whether liberal groups would have been so supportive of the PEPFAR 
initiative in 2003, if they had known what policies would be implemented by 2006.  Certainly, in 
the future, it will be harder to build conservative-liberal alliances on humanitarian issues. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, PEPFAR remains a historically unparalleled effort to address an epidemic 
ravaging the developing world.  Its practical impact should grow in coming years now that 
programs are established and generic drugs can be purchased with PEPFAR funds.  The way that 
PEPFAR has been justified and implemented also gives interesting clues about its future and the 
future of other humanitarian and aid programs.  The idea of AIDS as a security issue has 
receded.  U.S. programs remain an optional effort to address other countries’ crisis, so may be 
cut in the future.  Also, there seems little to be gained by supporters of other programs in trying 
to play the security card.  Multilateral AIDS efforts will continue, but they will not be as large as 
U.S. efforts.  Economic interests remain a factor in U.S. aid programs, but can under certain 
conditions be superseded by humanitarian goals.  Finally, as long as conservative Christian 
groups remain a major force at the White House, U.S. programs will be criticized internationally 
and liberal domestic groups will be wary of supporting administration initiatives. 
                                                 
28 David E. Sanger and Donald G. McNeil Jr. “Bush backs Condom Use to Prevent Spread of AIDS,” The New York 
Times, June 24, 2004. 
